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Emotions and Cognitions in Social Relationships:
A Neurosociological Approach
Emociones y Cognición en las relaciones sociales: un enfoque desde la neurosociología 
Abstract
Neurosociology is a new approach aimed at integrating social and biological sciences. In this paper, first we used
Alan Fiske’s theory (1992) of elementary forms of social relationships as a nexus between sociological studies
of groups and group-based emotions and relevant neuroscientific findings. Then, we identified types of social
situations that generate basic emotions (happiness, anger, sadness, and fear) within particular relationships.
Individuals participate differently in these situations. Therefore, they are expected to differ in their emotions
and cognitions, as well as in their underlying neural activity. Finally, we considered social affiliation and social
hierarchy corresponding to communal sharing and authority ranking social relationships to demonstrate the
logic of neurosociological research.
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Resumen
La neurosociología es un nuevo enfoque que busca integrar las ciencias sociales y biológicas. En este artículo,
primero aplicamos la teoría de Alan Fiske (1992), de las formas elementales de las relaciones sociales entendidas
como un nexo entre los estudios sociológicos de los grupos y las emociones grupales, junto con hallazgos de la
neurociencia. Luego, hemos identificado tipos de situaciones sociales que generan las emociones básicas (ale-
gría, ira, tristeza y miedo) dentro de ciertas relaciones particulares. Las personas participan de forma diferente
en estas situaciones. Por lo tanto, se espera que difieran en sus emociones y cogniciones, así como en su acti-
vidad neural subyacente. Por último, hemos considerado la afiliación social y la jerarquía social que corresponde
al intercambio comunal y el ranking de relaciones sociales para demostrar la lógica de la investigación neuroso-
ciológica.
Palabras clave: Emoción; Cognición; Relación Social; Afiliación Social; Jerarquía Social; Neurosociología.
* Docent at the Nizhny Novgorod Branch of Moscow State University of Economics, Statistics, and Informatics, and a candidate of
sociological sciences (equivalent to a PhD in sociology).
** Docent at the Nizhny Novgorod Branch of Moscow State University of Economics, Statistics, and Informatics, and a candidate of
sociological sciences (equivalent to a PhD in sociology).
Alexander V. Shkurko**
Nizhny Novgorod Branch of Moscow State University of
Economics, Statistics, and Informatics, Russia
khanovey@rambler.ru 
Yulia S. Shkurko*
Nizhny Novgorod Branch of Moscow State University of
Economics, Statistics, and Informatics, Russia
yushkurko@yandex.ru 









































































Advances in science can be stimulated by the
emergence of new research tools and methods as well
as by the transmission of concepts and theories from
other disciplines. Recent findings in brain research
have led to the appearance of a new research area —
social neuroscience— based on the integration of so-
cial psychology and neuroscience (e.g. Todorov, Fiske,
& Prentice, 2011; Decety & Christen, 2014). Social
neuroscience is now a well-established and respected
scientific discipline, with its own journals, scientific so-
cieties, and university departments. Beyond social
psychology, however, attempts to introduce neuro-
cognitive and affective processes into a broader social
science agenda are still infrequent and fragmentary.
Here, we focus on the integration of neurocog-
nitive and sociological research within the field of
neurosociology. Although the term can be traced back
to earlier works of Warren TenHouten (1997), more
systematic attempts to approach the problem have
been made only recently (Franks, 2010; Franks & Tur-
ner, 2012).We briefly discuss some promising paths of
argumentation linking the fast-growing body of kno-
wledge of social neuroscience with more traditional
sociological issues.
Causal chains linking neurocognitive and affec-
tive processes with the constitution of the society are
twofold. The first type of causal chain is a representa-
tional one, consistent with the constructivist tradition
in social science. Individuals’ responses to situations
are conditioned by their perception of the social world
and their “definition of the situation.” Social percep-
tion is now actively studied within the field of social
neuroscience, and many neural pathways are now evi-
dent. The second type of causality links neural orga-
nization to the “objective” conditions of life typical for
different societies, cultures, institutions, or social
groups. Both types of research are considered in the
current article. 
Given that the first line of investigation is now
significantly more informed and elaborated than the
second, we take it as the main focus of this article. We
use Alan Fiske’s theory of elementary forms of social
relationship (Fiske, 1992) as a starting point for un-
derstanding relations between cognition, emotion,
neural organization, and social institutions. At first, we
consider Fiske’s theory in relation to emotional expe-
rience and types of social actions. Then, we analyze
two specific types of social representation (social af-
filiation and social hierarchy), corresponding to com-
munal sharing and authority ranking relationships.
Considering these issues, we also sketch the possible
logic of the neurosociological study of social issues.
Elementary forms of social relationships and basic
emotions
Fiske has postulated that people construct and
participate in one of four forms of social relationships:
“communal sharing,” “authority ranking”, “equality
matching,” and “market pricing.” He argued that these
modes of organizing social life are endogenous pro-
ducts of the human mind, generated by universally
shared models of social relations; they are manifesta-
tions of elementary mental models (Fiske, 1992: 690).
In communal sharing relationships, people
“treat each other as all the same, focusing on com-
monalities and disregarding distinct individual identi-
ties” (Fiske, 1992: 690). Such social relationships are
reflected in interactions with close relatives, mother-
children relations, intense love, and in nationality
identification. Authority ranking relationships are
based on “a model of asymmetry among people who
are linearly ordered along some hierarchical social di-
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mension” (Fiske, 1992: 691). For instance, such rela-
tionships include both one between manager and em-
ployee in a hierarchical organizational structure and
one between spouses in patriarchal family cultures.
Equality matching relationships are based on “a
model of even balance and one-for-one correspon-
dence” (Ibid: 691), as in relations with acquaintances
and colleagues. Market pricing relationships are
based on “a model of proportionality in social rela-
tionships; people attend to ratios and rates” (Ibid:
691-692). Fiske notes that this type of social relations-
hip is always “organized in terms of cost-benefit ratios
and rational calculations of efficiency or expected uti-
lity” (Ibid: 692). The social interactions at the stock ex-
change and in a credit bank are often realized in the
framework of market pricing relationships.
Alan Fiske is not the only researcher who pro-
posed generalizing a typology of social life. We could
go back to the prominent sociologist Max Weber and
his theory of the types of social action. Although their
approaches have different background, conceptual
and methodological roots, we can make a parallelism
between Fiske’s market pricing relationship and We-
ber’s goal rational action based on eagerness to
achieve goals by applying the most effective instru-
ments. Emotions can be introduced into each theory
as a feature of social relationships or social actions for
deeper understanding of the social life. 
Weber’s types of social action can be differen-
tiated in accordance, inter alia, with emotionality.
Goal rational actions are emotionless, while affective
actions are the most emotional. Traditional and value
rational actions lie somewhere in between. 
It should be noted, however, that Weber was
mistaken in proposing the opposition of emotions and
rationality: Barbalet (2004) and others in recent so-
ciological studies on emotions cast doubt on the co-
rrectness of Weber’s idea. They argue that emotion
contributes to rationality according to two approa-
ches. In the first approach, emotions support rationa-
lity by providing it with salience and goal-formation;
and in the second approach, emotions and rationality
are seen to be continuous (Barbalet, 2004: 29; 38-54).
Weber’s mistake is also confirmed by relevant neu-
roscientific findings, including the results of direct
brain research on emotions in rational decision ma-
king (e.g., Damasio, 1994). Neuroscientific findings
pose a different source of verification concerning the
close connection between emotion and conscious-
ness. This idea has recently been supported by many
researchers (e.g., Tsychiya & Adolphs, 2007; Roberts,
2009) who have investigated the neural structures un-
derlying simultaneous emotional and conscious expe-
rience. The conclusion of a common neural basis for
consciousness and emotion is mainly drawn from the
investigations on brain lesions, especially in the amyg-
dala and anterior cingulate cortex. Specifically, when
these brain areas are damaged, abnormal emotional
reactions are observed (e.g., atypical ability to recog-
nize emotions by facial expressions) and conscious
processing is abnormal (as is observed in neurops-
ychiatric diseases such as autism, schizophrenia, an-
xiety disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder and
others). The connection between consciousness and
emotion is also revealed in studies of minimally cons-
cious states (e.g., Giacino et al., 2002). In these stu-
dies, the expression of emotions is considered to be
one of the criteria for conscious state versus coma or
some form of vegetative state. 
Taking these findings into account, we can con-
clude that rational social actions, based on conscious
processing, always imply emotional regulation. The
opposite, however, is not true: unconscious actions
are not emotionless. Emotions with different intensity
are always present in social actions.  
The above-mentioned idea is very useful for
further suggestions concerning emotions in social re-
lationships. In every social relationship, certainly the
full spectrum of emotions is present. At the same
time, different emotions are presumably more salient
in different social relationships. 
Emotions play an important role in social life. As
Lambie and Marcel (2002) note, the importance of
emotional experiences for understanding each other
and for normal social life is demonstrated in science fic-
tion, where robots, as a rule, lack emotions completely
or do not show the same emotions as humans, leading
to tensions between people and robots. In cognitive
science and psychology, the main emotional experien-
ces in human life are referred to as basic emotions. The
identification of several emotions as basic is often mo-
tivated by their evolutionary role for human survival
(e.g., Ekman, 1999). It is also emphasized that basic
emotions play a major role in the development of later-
appearing emotions and they therefore form a subset
distinct from other emotions (e.g., Campos et al., 2010:
102). In various lists of basic, culturally universal emo-
tions, happiness, anger, fear and sadness are most fre-
quently included (for a sociological review on basic
emotions see Turner, 2007: 2-12).
We set aside the discussion about the number
of and criteria for the identification of basic emotions








































































(e.g., Sсherer, 2005; Campos et al., 2010) as irrelevant
to the purpose of revealing connections between
emotions and social relationships. However, we take
the findings concerning connections between emo-
tions and modes of cognitive processes seriously (e.g.,
Subramaniam et al., 2009; Roberts, 2009). Individuals
realize at every moment one of the possible modes of
thinking, awareness, reflection, conscious, non-cons-
cious cognition, and others in accordance with emo-
tional experience. Thus, the features of cognition
correlate with emotions. Ekman directly points to this
relationship. He says that “specific emotions regulate
the way in which we think, and that this will be evi-
dent in memories, imagery and expectations” (Ekman,
1999: 55). Subramaniam and colleagues (2009) have
shown that positive and negative emotions determine
insight and analytical modes of decision making, res-
pectively.
Let us now consider the emotional specificity
of different types of social relationship. By definition,
in a communal sharing relationship, individuals share
the emotions of their group, being happiness, anger,
or other. In this relationship, individuals’ emotions are
equated. 
On the contrary, in an authority ranking rela-
tionship, emotions are unbalanced and differentiated
according to relative position. While establishing hie-
rarchical relations, the individual in the lower position
tends to be emotionally deprived and the individual
in the higher position is rewarded emotionally. 
In accordance with the logic of an equality mat-
ching relationship, any emotion should be reflected
by interacting individuals. Any imbalance in interper-
sonal exchange in this type of social relationship leads
to emotional tension.
A market pricing relationship implies the maxi-
mization of positive emotion by means of trade. Emo-
tional reward is especially high when the value
received exceeds the expected value.
In Table 1, we relate anger, fear, sadness, and
happiness to the social situations in which these
emotions appear. These emotions are strongly diffe-
rentiated from each other and each individual can
identify them introspectively. In addition, they show
differences in mental processes and underlying brain

























Threat to group well-being
Risk of status loss
Negative motivation (threat of
negative sanctions)
Possible reputational loss as the
result of inability to respond
adequately


























Social situations, in which the basic emotions appear, according to the type of social relationship
Source: Prepared by the authors.








































































Thus, emotional experiences depend strongly
on the features of the individual’s or group’s position
in a particular relationship. At the same time, emo-
tions contribute to social behavior, specifically to the
willingness to maintain or change the type of social
relationship. Generally, individuals are inclined to-
wards emotionally rewarding types of relationships
and/or types of social situations. Interestingly, in an
experimental situation, happier people were disposed
to positive social bonding (e.g., chatting with close
friends) after experiencing negative emotions (due to
simulated financial loss) in order to smooth negative
emotional consequences (Sul et al., 2013). Such ob-
servations contribute, in particular, to the hypothesis
that happier people are more inclined towards the
communal sharing social strategy than to others.
Given the neuroscientific idea of the connec-
tion of emotions to specific brain activity, the search
for neural mechanisms underlying behaviors within
social relationships embedded in different emotions
is a promising neurosociological strategy. Applying the
neuroscientific findings to the sociological domain, we
can potentially reveal the basic neural triggers of dif-
ferent types of social behavior. For example, neuros-
cientific research has demonstrated that fear, sadness
and disgust inhibit hunger and sexual drives, and that
the satisfaction of these needs leads to happiness,
while thwarting the satisfaction of those drives can
cause anger, despair, or sadness (Damasio, 2003: 50).
The basal forebrain, ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
amygdala, and brain stem nuclei are now identified
as emotion triggering sites. Damasio adds that for an
emotion to occur, the site must cause subsequent ac-
tivity in other sites, i.e., emotion results from the con-
certed participation of several sites within the brain
(Ibid: 59). As people of diverse social groups possess
different abilities to satisfy their needs, we can pro-
pose that they are differentiated by the set of emo-
tions they experience. Individuals and groups also
differ in the frequency and type of situations they en-
counter. Each situation induces different emotional
and behavioral effects, as well as underlying neural
mechanisms. From this, we can hypothesize differen-
ces in neural organization between members of va-
rious social groups.
Another natural and promising path for neuro-
sociological research is laboratory experiments in co-
llaboration with neuroscientists (for discussions see
von Scheve, 2011; Shkurko, 2014). Unfortunately, at
present such experimental studies aiming at identif-
ying neuroscientific mechanisms in relation to social
relationships are scarce (Iacoboni et al., 2004). In such
experiments, for example, we can simulate situations
for different types of social relationships and identify
neural activity underlying the observed relationships.
By comparing neural activity in correlation to the
emotion before and during stimulated relationships,
we can potentially elucidate the neural mechanisms
of emotional and behavioral changes in different so-
cial contexts.
Neurosociology of social affiliation
At the individual level, the participation in so-
cial relationships is mediated by the representation
of social structure, in particular, in a form of social ca-
tegorization. With regard to the social structure, two
types of social categorization can be distinguished: so-
cial affiliation and social hierarchy. The first one pro-
duces social identity, that is, identification with a
particular social group or category; and the second
one stratifies social agents according to perceived in-
equality in the distribution of valuable resources.
These two types of social categorization correspond
to communal sharing and authority ranking relations-
hips in Fiske’s theory. 
Social categorization implies that others are or
can be perceived as members of a larger collective
unity rather than as individuals. Features associated
with the social group are then applied to an indivi-
dual. Social categorization is considered to be an ef-
fective cognitive tool facilitating navigation in the
social world and behavioral responses to situations. 
Social categories differ in their cognitive and af-
fective contents. Examples of social categories include
“an Argentinean”, “a football fan”, “a taxi driver”, and
“an old man.” Each of them is associated with some
contents such as “speaks Spanish”, “knows the names
of football players”, “yellow cab”, and “is on a pen-
sion”. Such categories and their associated contents
are numerous and the study of particular social insti-
tutions makes it necessary to study all these contents.
However, many different categorizations have
much in common so that many social relations are re-
gulated by rather universal mechanisms. First, when
we classify the social world, this classification is typi-
cally egocentric, that is, we identify ourselves with
one of the categories within a certain classification
system. Moreover, our reactions to “our” group or ca-
tegory versus “others” are very similar, irrespective
of the nature of the category. This idea is at the heart








































































of both social identity and self-categorization theories
(Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner & Reynolds, 2003). The idea
of social categorization eventually leads to a hypothe-
sis of a very abstract and universal form of social clas-
sification —the basic binary distinction between “Us”
and “Them” (Shkurko, 2013; in press).
Despite discussions on the nature and mecha-
nisms of such an elementary categorization, there are
similarities in the construction of social identities. Stu-
dies in social cognitive and affective neuroscience re-
veal how social categorization modulates human
cognition, emotion, and behavior.
Both psychological and social neuroscience ex-
periments reveal emotions and cognitions to be mo-
dulated by the perceived category of “others.” In
general, the emotional valence of a stimulus depends
on its perceived social status: those associated with
one’s own group trigger neural pathways processing
positive emotions, while outgroup stimuli trigger
more negatively valenced emotions. Although it may
seem trivial, a detailed knowledge of the neural me-
chanisms is still necessary and useful for a deeper un-
derstanding of socially based emotions. In particular,
several emotions are shown to be processed diffe-
rently in the brain in response to various social cate-
gorizations.
Fear is probably the most investigated emotion
in social neuroscience. Its neural processing is strongly
associated with activity in the amygdala and has been
shown to be modulated by the target’s social cate-
gory. Outgroup targets trigger greater activity in the
amygdala, most notably in the case of racial category
(Hart et al., 2000; Cunningham et al., 2004; Wheeler
& Fiske, 2005).  
The status of the target also modulates neural
processing of empathy. Ingroup members typically
prompt greater activity in the temporoparietal junc-
tion, often associated with empathy (Adams et al.,
2010; Cheon et al., 2011).
Another socially based emotion is gloating, in-
volving reward processing in the brain: an outgroup
member’s loss is perceived as one’s own gain (Taka-
hashi et al., 2009). In a study by Hein and colleagues
(2010), football fans observed and manipulated pain-
ful events involving their own and enemy team fans.
While observing friends’ pain involved an empathic
response, the response to foes’ pain involved activa-
tion in the dopaminergic pathways.
The brain also responds differently to emotio-
nally valenced faces of people from different social
groups. Faces with angry, happy, and other emotional
expressions are processed differently for ingroup and
outgroup members (Chiao et al., 2008; Vrtička et al.,
2008; Hoehl et al., 2010).
Such social categorization is not limited by such
a simplistic binary opposition as the ingroup/outgroup
distinction, though. More elaborate classification
systems exist and correspond to specific emotional
and cognitive content. For example, within the so-ca-
lled Stereotype Content Model, two dimensions of so-
cial categorization are proposed: competence and
warmth. Harris and Fiske (2007) suppose that the four
types of social categories produced by the combina-
tion of these dimensions correspond to four specific
social emotions:
Envy: directed toward targets with high compe-
tence and low warmth
Pride: corresponds to targets with high compe-
tence and high warmth
Pity: directed toward targets with low competence
and high warmth
Disgust: directed toward targets with low compe-
tence and low warmth
In a well-known fMRI study, the authors tried
to find differential neural correlates for these four ca-
tegory types. The most interesting finding was a spe-
cific neural response associated with the low
competence/low warmth social group (e.g., homeless
individuals). Activity in the mentalizing-related neural
network typical for other social groups is absent in the
case of the low-competence and low-warmth group.
Instead, the perception of this group was associated
with activity in the insula —a brain area that also fires
in response to disgusting stimuli. In terms of social ca-
tegorization, this is a sign of the so-called “dehuma-
nization” process: some social agents cross the
ultimate boundary between “human” and “not
human”.
The examples mentioned above are descriptive
ones. They have their own value as steps toward a
better understanding of social perception. A specific
neurosociological agenda appears when we try to link
the neurocognitive and neuroaffective machinery to
social institutions. 
Although social categorization has long been
studied within social psychology and social neuros-
cience, here our interest is its more complicated so-
ciological aspects. The general logic of the
neurosociology of social categorization is as follows:
1. Within a categorization schema, every cate-








































































gory is associated with particular cognitive and affec-
tive content. 
2. Various cognitive and affective contents in-
volve different neural pathways with differing beha-
vioral responses.
3. Multiple categorization systems can poten-
tially be applied to individuals.
4. Societies in general and particular social con-
texts differ in the priority and salience of social cate-
gories.
5. Social categories are distributed socially.
Consequently, corresponding cognitive and affective
contents —with their behavioral effects— are distri-
buted socially as well.
6. Both institutional design and neural architec-
ture contribute to each other’s constitution and func-
tionality. 
Understanding the neurocognitive and affec-
tive nature of social representation can also shed light
on the differences in human behavior observed in
structurally similar situations within different institu-
tions, societies, and cultures. Take, as an example, the
family as a basic social unit. Although there are nu-
merous studies revealing differences in the types of
families, their structures and functions within diffe-
rent cultures or historical epochs, there are also im-
portant cognitive and affective mechanisms of family
category processing. Several studies show how mem-
bers of a family are perceived in individualistic versus
collectivistic societies (Harada et al., 2010; Ng et al.,
2010). One interpretation is that these differences
rise from manipulation of the self-other distinction in
such a way that the eventual concept of the family
can be constructed in very different ways: either by
the inclusion of others into the self-concept, or by ra-
tional calculation of possible alliances. 
These two modes of categorization differ in
their emotional content as well. The first one features
communal sharing relationships with relevant emo-
tions such as happiness and empathy. The second one
is characterized rather by market pricing relationships
with reward-related emotions. Both can produce si-
milar behavioral effects. The difference in cognitive
and affective processing is crucial for understanding
how the social world is constructed and for predicting
individuals’ attitudes, values, responses to situations,
as well as possible institutional design.
Neurosociology of social hierarchy
Unequal distribution of resources, leading to
authority ranking relationships, is probably the most
important information an individual must obtain. Kno-
wing the status of oneself and others is crucial for
choosing individual strategies in various realms of so-
cial life, be that mating behavior, consumption, or
scientific publication. Representation of one’s own
position and the position of others in the social hie-
rarchy is thus an evolutionarily useful mechanism. Be-
yond the ingroup-outgroup distinction, social
hierarchy operates via binary opposition and is a re-
lational form because any individual may be conside-
red as taking a high or low position when compared
to those who are lower or higher. Similarly in market
pricing relationship, decision-making studies show
that what matters is relative value, not absolute (Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979). Emotional reaction to the
outcome of a decision depends on its expected value:
if you gain more than expected, you feel positive
emotions, and if you gain less, you feel negative ones,
even if the value is the same.
Social hierarchy can be treated as a general
form due to its applicability across various resources.
Political power, economic capital, reputation, as well
as physical strength, intellect, or skills are all various
dimensions of social ranking. An individual may rank
high in one dimension but low in others. The question
is whether these different types of resources can be
processed in a similar manner and have a common
cognitive and affective basis. 
What are the cognitive mechanisms underlying
representations of social hierarchy? There is evidence
that understanding social hierarchy may be similar to
or even based on the representation of other interval
variables, e.g., numbers. Studies (Chiao et al., 2009;
Yamakawa et al., 2009) show both behavioral and
neural evidence that social status information is pro-
cessed by the mind and brain in a similar manner as
the estimation of physical or numerical distance. This
is compatible with the intuitions of social scientists
about “social space” (Bourdieu, 1987), in which social
positions are measured in terms of distance. Unders-
tanding one’s position in the social world by measu-
ring distance may not be mere metaphor but a true
cognitive mechanism of social perception. The role of
emotions in this mechanism can be hypothesized in
two ways. First, emotions associated with taking high
or low position within authority ranking relationship
appear as the result of social distance measurement.








































































Another possible role of emotions may be related to
the dopaminergic system known to be involved in le-
arning processes. Dopamine, an actively investigated
neurotransmitter, plays a key role in encoding the so-
called prediction error —a difference between actual
and expected value. When one’s measure of social
rank turns out to be wrong, an updating process pro-
bably involves this dopaminergic system and dopa-
mine-related emotions (e.g., those associated with
pleasure). 
Another dopamine-based mechanism likely to
be involved in the representation of social hierarchy
deals with the reward-processing system. Obtaining a
high position is considered as a reward, and the
change in one’s relative position is considered via win-
or-lose opposition. Both behavioral and neuroscientific
studies indicate that personally relevant social hie-
rarchy contexts involve the reward-processing system
(Kishida еt al., 2012; Zink et al., 2008), in contrast with
allocentric contexts, in which estimation of social hi-
erarchy is personally irrelevant (Farrow et al., 2011).
This reward-related aspect of social hierarchy sheds
light on the aforementioned multidimensional nature
of stratification systems. The fact that various types of
rewarding stimuli, such as food, money, social rank, at-
tractive faces, etc., involve the same dopaminergic sys-
tem (e.g., Alves et al., 2011; McClure et al., 2004a; Lin
et al., 2012) leads to the hypothesis of a common neu-
ral currency. This common neural currency is able to
serve the general hierarchy-related form of social cat-
egorization by converting various types of hierarchies
into one interval variable of reward.  
Representing inequalities in resources, social
hierarchy is known to be crucial for modulating ap-
proaching/avoidance behavior, both in animals and
humans. In social interaction, a target’s perceived po-
sition modulates allocation of attentional resources
(Zink et al., 2008; Deaner et al., 2005) and behavioral
strategy, including behavioral inhibition in low-ranked
agents (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Maynard Smith,
1974). Broadcasting one’s relational status signifi-
cantly affects cognitive performance (Kishida et al.,
2012), probably due to inappropriate allocation of
cognitive resources (Derks et al., 2008). 
Throughout social science research, inequalities
and social status have been linked to motivation, life
and labor styles, migration, health, as well as educa-
tional, marital, and reproductive strategies. However,
the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying the
long-term effects of taking a high or low position, be-
yond the immediate social situation, remain mysteri-
ous. The fact that subjectively low socioeconomic sta-
tus is associated with negative self-estimation, poor
health and health-related behaviors (e.g. Demakakos
et al., 2008; Reitzel et al., 2011), and even with partic-
ular brain markers (Gianaros et al., 2007), goes far be-
yond contextual reward-related comparisons. We
assume that repetition and reinforcing of such situa-
tional downward or upward comparisons can produce
long-term somatic and health-related effects. 
Imagine a researcher taking a high position in
a local community, both administratively and by rep-
utation. He or she may well benefit from being a
“boss” in many social situations on a daily basis. This
person is dominant in social interactions, perceptions,
and evaluations. At the same time, the researcher
may recognize that in other contexts of comparison,
he or she is not on the top. In comparison with the
global scientific community, and especially with what
is called the research core, he or she is probably low-
ranked. To avoid disappointment, this person may
choose the strategy of staying in the local community
and may even refrain from submitting an article to a
high-ranked journal. Thus, the researcher rationally
arranged life in such a way as to maximize rewarding
situations derived from high rank. However, the very
choice of this strategy is a choice within a categoriza-
tion system in which this researcher is low-ranked.
Moreover, this particular categorization system should
be available at all times, in all situations to which his
or her position as a researcher is salient. Although
daily contexts involving downward comparisons and
strategic upward comparisons are structurally equiv-
alent (albeit inverse), it seems they must be processed
differently by humans. Alternatively, one system could
simultaneously work in opposite directions, being
both emotionally positive and negative. 
This example differs from a three-agent situa-
tion in which one is simultaneously presented with
high- and low-ranked individuals. We predict that in
this case, the subject’s behavior would be governed
by upward comparison. In the type of situation exem-
plified above, there is an interaction between two cat-
egorizations within one hierarchical axis, one of which
is more in the background and the other one in the
foreground. This interaction can probably be traced
to the difference between immediate and delayed re-
wards (Kim et al., 2012; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Mc-
Clure et al., 2004b). The question for further empirical
research is whether representation of social hierarchy
is purely relational or, instead, it is better described
by content-free but absolute scales, in such a way that








































































relational position, determined by contextual compar-
ison, interacts with the effects of a context-free state
of dominance or submissiveness, as supposed by An-
derson and Berdahl (2002).
The “objective” side of social hierarchy also has
its specific neural pathways and mechanisms. People
from low and high social strata differ in their condi-
tions of life; moreover, data suggest that these envi-
ronmental changes direct brain development and
functioning differently. 
Indeed, people from lower strata often live in a
more stressful environment, facing more risk and un-
certainty in their lives. Such an environment con-
stantly affecting the brain shapes the neural
architecture, especially in the areas associated with
cognitive control. Stress affects several brain areas in-
cluding the prefrontal cortex, which is associated with
cognitive control, and the amygdala, associated, inter
alia, with emotional response (Arnsten, 2009; Cools
& D’Esposito, 2011).
In the model developed by Davis in accordance
with Tilly’s theory of durable inequality, specific con-
ditions of life typical for people from lower social
classes modulate social behavior through stress-re-
lated pathways (Davis, 2013). Stressors are proposed
to release dopamine—the neuromediator crucial for
many neurocognitive and affective processes. The
prefrontal cortex is inhibited by dopamine release,
and this weakens cognitive control and decreases the
value of time-delayed reward. At the same time,
dopamine increases activity in the anterior cingulate
cortex, thus increasing the expected value of a stimu-
lus and stimulating risk behavior. Finally, in the limbic
part of the social brain, dopamine stimulates aggres-
sive emotional reactions. In sum, the effects of stress-
related dopaminergic pathways include greater atten-
tion toward the immediate environment and
decreased value of long-term goals and rewards.
It is worth noting that the stress-related mech-
anism described above can only be applied to those
situations in which lower-ranked social groups indeed
live in a more stressful and uncertain environment. In
some societies, however, less privileged groups live in
poor but stable and more or less secure environ-
ments, not associated with greater daily risk and
stress. In such a case, different neurosociological
mechanisms should be proposed. 
Conclusion
Social life occurs across different social situa-
tions, which are organized according to communal
sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and
market pricing social relationships. People facing
these different social situations experience relevant
emotions and cognitions. We assume that people are
involved in these social situations with different fre-
quencies. Therefore, they correspondingly experience
the relevant cognitions and emotions with differing
frequencies. Neuroscience reveals neural mechanisms
that produce behavioral effects for different emo-
tional experiences. These findings allow for a detailed
and systematic explanation of the linkage between so-
cial structure and individual neural organization. Such
explanations constitute a primary focus of the emerg-
ing field of neurosociology. 
References
ADAMS, R.B.Jr., RULE, N.O., FRANKLIN, R.G.Jr., et al.
(2010). “Cross-cultural reading the mind in the eyes:
an fMRI investigation”. Journal of Cognitive Neuro-
science, 22, 97–108.
ALVES, F. da S., SCHMIZ, N., FIGEE, M., Abeling, N.,
HASLER, G., VAN DER MEER, J., NEDERVEEN, A., DE
HAAN, L., LINSZEN, D., & VAN AMELSVOORT, T. (2011).
“Dopaminergic modulation of the human reward sys-
tem: a placebo-controlled dopamine depletion study”.
Journal of Psychopharmacology, 2, 538-549.
ANDERSON, C. & BERDAHL, J.L. (2002). “The experi-
ence of power: Examining the effects of power on ap-
proach and inhibition tendencies”. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1362–1377.
ARNSTEN, A.F.T. (2009). “Stress signaling pathways
that impair prefrontal cortex structure and function”.
Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 10, 410-422. 
BARBALET, J.M. (2004). Emotion, Social Theory, and
Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach. Cam-
bridge University Press.








































































BOURDIER, P. (1987). “Espace social et pouvoir sym-
bolique”. In P. Bourdieu. Choses dites. Paris: Editions
de Minuit.
CAMPOS, J.J., DAHL, A., & HE, M. (2010). “Beyond
Breaches and Battles: Clarifying Important Misconcep-
tions about Emotion”. Emotion Review, 2 (2), 100–104. 
CHEON, B.K., IM, D.M., HARADA, T., et al. (2011). “Cul-
tural influences on neural basis of intergroup empa-
thy”. NeuroImage, 57, 642–650.
CHIAO, J.Y., HARADA, T., OBY, E.R., LI, Z., PARRISHA, T.,
& BRIDGE, D.J. (2009). “Neural representations of so-
cial status hierarchy in human parietal cortex”. Neu-
ropsychologia, 47, 354-363.
CHIAO, J.Y., IIDAKA, T., GORDON, H.L., et al. (2008).
“Cultural specificity in amygdala response to fear
faces”. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 2167–
2174.
COOLS, R. & D’ESPOSITO, M. (2011). “Inverted-U-
Shaped dopamine actions on human working memory
and cognitive control”. Biological Psychiatry, 69, 113-
125.
CUNNINGHAM, W.A., JOHNSON, M.K., RAYE, C.L.,
GATENBY, J.C., GORE, J.C., & BANAJJI, M.R. (2004).
“Separable neural components in the processing of
Black and White faces”. Psychological Science, 15,
806–813.
DAMASIO, A. (2003). Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow,
and the Feeling Brain. London: William Heinemann.
__________ (1994). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Rea-
son, and the Human Brain. New York: Avon Books
DAVISAVIS, J. (2013). “Persistent Inequality: A Neu-
rosociological perspective”. In D.D. Franks & J.H.
Turner (eds.), Handbook of Neurosociology. Springer. 
DEANER, R.O., KHERA, A.V., & PLATT, M.L. (2005).
“Monkeys pay per view: Adaptive valuation of social
images by rhesus macaques”. Current Biology, 15,
543–548.
DECETY, J. & CHRISTENH, Y. (eds.) (2014). New Fron-
tiers in Social Neuroscience. Springer.
DEMAKAKOS, P., NAZROO, J., BREEZE, E., & MARMOT,
M. (2008). “Socioeconomic status and health: the role
of subjective social status”. Social Science & Medicine,
67, 330-340.
DERKS, B., INZLICHT, M., & KANG, S. (2008). “The neu-
roscience of stereotype threat”. Group Processes and
Intergroup Relations, 11, 163-181. 
EKMAN, P. (1999). “Basic Emotions”. In T. Dalgleish &
M. Power (eds.), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion.
John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
FARROW, T.F.D., JONES, S.C., KAYLOR-HUGHES, C.J.,
WILKINSON, I.D., WOODRUFF, P.W.R., HUNTER, M.D.,
& SPENCE, S.A. (2011). “Higher or lower? The func-
tional anatomy of perceived allocentric social hierar-
chies”. NeuroImage, 57, 1552-1560.
FISKE, A. (1992) “The Four Elementary Forms of So-
ciality: Framework for a Unified Theory of Social Re-
lations”. Psychological Review, 99(4), 689-723
FRANKS, D.D. & Turner, J.H. (eds.) (2013). Handbook
of Neurosociology. Springer.
__________ (2010). Neurosociology: The nexus be-
tween neuroscience and social psychology. Springer.
FUJII, N., HIHARA, S., NAGASAKA, Y., & IRIKI, A. (2009).
“Social state representation in prefrontal cortex”. So-
cial Neuroscience, 4, 73–84. 
GIACINO, J.T., ASHWARD, S., CHILDS, N., CRANFORD,
R., JENNETT, B., KATZ, D.I., KELLY, J.P., ROSENBERG,
J.H., WHYTE, J., ZAFONTE, R.D., & ZASLERET, N.D.
(2002). “The minimally conscious state: Definition and
diagnostic criteria”. Neurology, 58, 349 – 353.
GIANAROS, P.J., HORENSTEIN, J.A., COHEN, S.,
MATTHEWS, K.A., BROWN, S.M., FLORY, J.D., CRITCH-
LEY, H.D., MANUCK, S.B., & HARIRI, A.R. (2007). “Peri-
genual anterior cingulate morphology covaries with
perceived social standing”. SCAN, 2, 161–173. 
HARADAL, T., Li, Z., & CHIAO, J.Y. (2010). “Differential
dorsal and ventral  medial prefrontal representations
of the implicit self modulated by individualism and
collectivism: an fMRI study”. Social Neuroscience, 5,
257–271.








































































HARRIS, L.T. & FISKE, S.T. (2007). “Social groups that
elicit disgust are differentially processed in mPFC”.
SCAN, 2: 45-51.
HART, A.J., WHALEN, P.J., SHISN, L.M., McINERNEY,
S.C., FISHER, H., & RAUCH, S.L. (2000). “Differential re-
sponse in the human amygdala to racial outgroup vs
ingroup face stimuli”. NeuroReport, 11, 2351–2355.
HEIN, G., SILANI, G., PREUSCHOFF, K., BATSON, C.D.,
& SINGER, T. (2010). “Neural responses to ingroup and
outgroup members’ suffering predict individual differ-
ences in costly helping”. Neuron, 68, 149–160.
HOEHL, S., BRAUER, J., BRASSE, G., STRIANO, T., &
FRIEDERICIR, A.D. (2010). “Children’s processing of
emotions expressed by peers and adults: An fMRI
study”. Social Neuroscience, 5, 543–559.
IACOBONI, M., LIEBERMAN, M.D., KNOWLTON, B.J., et
al. (2004). “Watching social interactions produces dor-
somedial prefrontal and medial parietal BOLD fMRI
signal increases compared to a resting baseline”. Neu-
roImage, 21, 1167-1173.
KABLE, J.W. & GLIMCHER, P.W. (2007). “The neural cor-
relates of subjective value during intertemporal
choice”. Nature Neuroscience, 10, 1625-1633. 
KAHNEMAN, D. & TVERSKY, A. (1979). “Prospect the-
ory: An analysis of decision under risk”. Econometrica,
47, 263-291.
KIM, B., Sung, Y. S., & McCLURE, S.M. (2012). “The
neural basis of cultural differences in delay discount-
ing”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society.
B, 367, 650–656. 
KISHIDA, K.T., YANG, D., QUARTZ, K.H., QUARTZ, S.R., &
MONTAGUE, P.R. (2012). “Implicit signals in small group
settings and their impact on the expression of cognitive
capacity and associated brain responses”. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B, 367, 704-716.
LAMBIE, J.A. & MARCEL, A.J. (2002). “Consciousness
and the varieties of emotion experience: a theoretical
framework”. Psychological Review, 109 (2), 219-259. 
LIN, A., ADOLPHS, R., & RANGEL, A. (2012). “Social and
monetary reward learning engage overlapping neural
substrates”. SCAN, 7(3), 274-281. 
MAYNARD SMITH, J. (1974). “The theory of games and
the evolution of animal conflicts”. Journal of Theoret-
ical Biology, 47, 209-221.
McCLURE, S.M., LAIBSON, D.I., LOEWENSTEIN, G., &
COHEN, J.D. (2004b). “Separate neural systems value
immediate and delayed monetary rewards”. Science,
306, 503-507. 
McCLURE, S.M., YORK, M.K., & MONTAGUE, P.R.
(2004a). “The neural substrates of reward processing
in humans: the modern role of fMRI”. Neuroscientist,
10, 260-268. 
NG, S.H., HAN, S., MAO, L., & LAI, J.C.L. (2010). “Dy-
namic bicultural brains: fMRI study of their flexible
neural representation of self and significant others in
response to culture primes”. Asian Journal of Social
Psychology, 13, 83-91
REITZELl, L.R., BUSINELLE, M.S., KENDZOR, D.E., LI, Y.,
CAO, Y., CASTRO, Y., MAZAS, C.A., COFTA-WOERPEL,
L., CINCIRIPINI, P.M., & WETTER, D.W. (2011). “Subjec-
tive social status predicts long-term smoking absti-
nence”. BMC Public Health, 11, 135-142.
ROBERTS, R.C. (2009). “Emotional Consciousness and
Personal Relationships”. Emotion Review, 1(3), 281–288
SCHERER, K.R. (2005). “What are emotions? And how
can they be measured?”. Social Science Information,
44(4), 695–729.
SHKURKO, A.V. (2013). “Is social categorization based
on relational ingroup/outgroup distinction? A meta-
analysis”. SCAN, 8, 870-877.
___________  (in press). “Cognitive mechanisms of in-
group/outgroup distinction”. Journal for the Theory of
Social Behaviour. DOI: 10.1111/jtsb.12063.
SHKURKO, Y.S. (2014). “Neurosociological Perspectives
on Consciousness within and beyond Sociology: A
Case Study of the Selectivity of Consciousness”. The
International Journal of Interdisciplinary Cultural Stud-
ies, 7 (4), 41-48.
SUBRAMANIAM, K., KOUNIOS, J., PARRISH, T.B., &
JUNG-BEEMAN M. (2009). “A brain mechanism for fa-
cilitation of insight by positive affect”. Journal of Cog-
nitive Neuroscience, 21, 415-435.








































































SUL, S., KIM, J. & CHOI, I. (2013). “Subjective Well-
Being and Hedonic Editing: How Happy People Maxi-
mize Joint Outcomes of Loss and Gain”. Journal of
Happiness Studies, 14 (4), 1409-1430.
TAJFEL, H., BILLIG, M.G., BUNDY, R.P., & FLAMENT, C.
(1971). “Social categorization and intergroup behav-
ior”. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149-178.
TAKAHASHI, H., KATO, M., MATSUURA, M., MOBBS,
D., SUHARA, T., & OKUBO, Y. (2009). “When your gain
is my pain and your pain is my gain: Neural correlates
of envy and schadenfreude”. Science, 323, 937–939.
TENHOUTEN, W. (1997). “Neurosociology”. Journal of
Social and Evolutionary Systems, 20(1), 7–37.
TODOROV, A., FISKE, S.T., & PRENTICE, D.A. (eds.)
(2011). Social Neuroscience: Toward understanding
the underpinnings of the social mind. N.Y.: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
TSYCHIYA, N. & ADOLPHS, R. (2007) “Emotions and
Consciousness”. Trends in cognitive science,
11(4):158-167.
TURNER, J. (2007). Human Emotions: A Sociological
Theory. London & New York: Routllege
TURNER, J.C. & REYNOLDS, K.J. (2003). “The social
identity perspective in intergroup relations: Theories,
themes, and controversies”. In R.Brown & S.L.Gaert-
ner (eds.), Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology:
Intergroup Processes. Malden: Blackwell. PP.133-152.
VON SCHEVE, C. (2011). Sociology of Neuroscience or
Neurosociology? In M. Pickersgill & van I. Keulen
(eds.), Sociological Reflections on the Neurosciences
(Advances in Medical Sociology, 13). Bingley: Emerald
Group Publishing Limited.
VRITICKA, P., ANDERSSON, F., GRANDJEAN, D., SANDER,
D., & VUILLERMIER , P. (2008). “Individual attachment
style modulates human amygdala and striatum activa-
tion during social appraisal”. PLoS ONE, 3, e2868.
WHEELER, M.E. & FISKE, S.T. (2005). “Controlling racial
prejudice: social-cognitive goals affect amygdala and
stereotype activation”. Psychological Science, 16, 56–63.
YAMAKAWA, Y., KANAI, R., MATSUMURA, M., &
NAITO, E. (2009). “Social distance evaluation in
human parietal cortex”. PLoS ONE, 4, e4360. 
ZINK, C.F., TONG, Y., CHEN, Q., BASSETT, D.S., STEIN,
L.L., & MEYER-LINDENBERG, A. (2008). “Know your
place: Neural processing of social hierarchy in hu-
mans”. Neuron, 58, 273-283.
Citado.
SHKURKO, Yulia S. y SHKURKO, Alexander V. (2014) “Emotions and Cognitions in Social Relations-
hips: A Neurosociological Approach” en Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios sobre Cuerpos, Emo-
ciones y Sociedad - RELACES, N°15. Año 6. Agosto - Noviembre 2014. Córdoba. ISSN: 1852.8759.
pp. 99-110. Disponible en: http://www.relaces.com.ar/index.php/ relaces/article/view/334
Plazos.
Recibido: 28/06/2014. Aceptado: 16/08/2014.
Cuerpos, Emociones y Sociedad
[110]
C
U
E
R
P
O
S
, 
E
M
O
C
IO
N
E
S
 Y
 S
O
C
IE
D
A
D
, 
C
o
́rd
o
b
a
, 
N
°1
5
, 
A
n
̃o
 6
, 
p
. 
9
9
-1
1
0
, 
A
g
o
st
o
 2
0
1
4
 -
 N
o
vi
e
m
b
re
 2
0
1
4
